


















The returns to education remain a central concern for development policy. In 
developed countries there is evidence that the returns to education have been rising. 
Evidence for changes over this period for developing countries is limited. In this 
paper we use data from Kenya and Tanzania to estimate returns to education for 
manufacturing workers and examine how these returns have changed from 1980 to the 
late 1990s. We find strong evidence that the earnings function is convex for both 
countries and document significant differences in the earnings profiles across cohorts, 
typically with stronger convexity amongst the young. We also find evidence of 
increasing convexity over the 1990s in Tanzania, but remarkable stability in Kenya. 
We test for the importance of ability bias and find convexity robust to endogeneity. 
Treating education as an endogenous explanatory variable generally results in higher 
estimated returns to education than what is obtained by OLS. Potential reasons for this 
result are discussed.  
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Education is often seen as the main policy instrument for reducing poverty in developing 
countries. Two broad empirical generalisations are central to the argument that expanding 
education will help the poor. The first is that in developing countries the returns to education 
are relatively high, the second is that the returns are concave with respect to education. One 
common policy recommendation based on concavity is that, because of higher returns to 
primary relative to higher levels of education, expanding primary education should be the 
priority (Psacharopoulos, 1994). However, the notion that earnings functions are concave in 
education has been challenged for both developed and developing countries.
1 If in fact the 
earnings function is convex then marginal returns to education will be lowest for the 
individuals with the least education, with obvious implications for the demand for education, 
the distribution of income and the effectiveness with which education can serve to reduce 
poverty.  
In this paper we investigate the shape and the dynamics of the earnings function for 
two African countries - Kenya and Tanzania.
2 We have comparable data on workers in 
manufacturing firms over the 1990s so we can trace changes in the shape of the earnings 
function in detail over this period. We can put these changes in a longer term context as 
excellent data exist for the returns on education in the 1980s (Knight and Sabot, 1990). We 
can also ask if the earnings profile differs across cohorts, another dimension of our dynamic 
analysis.  
                                                 
1 Kingon and Unni (2001) report that, for urban India, returns increase with the level of education; 
Duraisamy (2002) finds a similar result. Belzil and Hansen (2002) report increasing marginal returns to 
education in the U.S., up to grade 14. Bennell (1996) argues that the results reported by Psacharopoulos 
(1994) are not credible due to methodological shortcomings. 
2 Available empirical evidence shows mixed results concerning changes in returns to education in the 
1990s in sub-Saharan Africa. Krishnan, Sellassie and Dercon (1998) show that educational returns did 
not change in urban Ethiopia despite labor market reforms instituted in early 1990s. In contrast in 
Uganda, from 1992 to 1999, returns to education increased markedly, Appleton (2002) and in Ghana 
from 1987 to 1991 there is evidence of rising returns, Canagarajah and Thomas (1997). These studies 
have been confined to relatively short time periods. Where longer run comparisons have been made 
there is evidence of falls. In South Africa, Moll (1996) reports that returns to primary education 
declined from 1960 to 1975. In urban labour markets in Kenya between 1978 and 1995 Appleton, 
Bigsten and Manda, (1999) report declines in returns to education for workers with secondary 
education and below.  
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Kenya and Tanzania offer an interesting opportunity to analyse the connections 
between earnings and education, because the different educational policies pursued by the two 
countries in the 1980s constituted close to a natural experiment (Knight and Sabot, 1990). 
While Kenya allowed a rapid expansion of secondary education, much of it privately 
financed, Tanzania severely restricted access to secondary education and introduced wage 
polices to reduce differentials. By comparing Kenya and Tanzania we can therefore find out 
the long run consequences in the 1990s of these very different policies adopted in the 1980s. 
Further, in the 1990s educational and other policies in Tanzania became much more similar to 
those in Kenya. Have returns to education in Tanzania become more like those in Kenya as a 
result? 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 outlines our empirical 
framework, Section 3 discusses the data and shows summary statistics, Section 4 shows OLS 
estimates of the earnings functions, Section 5 provides a comparative analysis over time and 
across cohorts, Section 6 shows additional results in which education is treated as an 
endogenous variable, Section 7 provides a summary and conclusions. 
 
2.  The Earnings Model 
We write our baseline model of earnings as 
() m m ct m m s f x w υ α + + ⋅ = l n           ( 1 )  
where wm is real earnings,  m x  is a vector of worker characteristics excluding education, α  is 
a parameter vector to be estimated,  m s  is the years of education,  () ⋅ ct f  is the education-
earnings profile,  m υ  is a residual, and {m, c, t} are indices for observation, cohort and time, 
respectively.
3 Variables included in  m x  are years of tenure, age and age squared, a dummy 
variable for whether the individual is a male or not and a dummy variable for whether the 
individual lives in the capital city. Our data begin in 1993 and span seven years for Kenya and 
                                                 
3 We do not have panel data on individuals (see Section 3), hence there is no need for {i,t} subscripts 
on the variables.   
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eight years for Tanzania, and central to our concerns is whether the returns to education have 
changed over this period and whether there are differences across cohorts. Therefore we 
estimate period-cohort specific profiles, reflected in (1) by the ct subscripts.  
Most empirical studies in this area assume log earnings to be linear or quadratic in 
years of education. We seek to document the shape of the entire earnings-education profile, 
and therefore adopt a more flexible approach specifying  () ⋅ ct f  as a piecewise linear spline 
function with J nodes at selected levels of education:  
() ∑
=
− ⋅ + ⋅ + + =
J
j
j m jct m ct c t m ct s s s f
1
0 } 0 , max{ θ β β ι µ , 
where  j θ  denote the position of the jth node,  t µ  and  c ι  are time and cohort effects (intercept 
shifters). The slope of the earnings-education profile, often referred to as the marginal or local 
return to education, may vary across the different segments depending on the coefficients 
jct ct β β ,..., 0 . The coefficient  ct 0 β  is interpretable as the slope of the profile in the first 
education interval (i.e. for the lowest levels of education), while  jct β  for  0 > j  is 
interpretable as the change in the slope of the profile that results from moving from the 
education interval  } , { 1 j j θ θ −  to  } , { 1 + j j θ θ , where  0 0 = θ .  The slope of the earnings function 
in the interval  } , { 1 j j θ θ − , 0 > j , is thus given by  ∑ = + j
i ict ct β β 1 0 . Hence, if 
0 ,..., 2 1 = = = = Jct ct ct β β β , the earnings function is linear.  
In the empirical analysis we begin by taking education to be exogenous, i.e. 
uncorrelated with the residual in the earnings regression. We then consider the effects of 
treating education as an endogenous variable, using a control function approach. Throughout 
the analysis we put in nodes of the earnings-education profile  () ⋅ ct f  at 7, 10 and 12 years of 
education. Using four segments of the earnings-education profile ensures that there is a 
reasonable number of observations in each category. We divide the data into two cohorts 
only, where an individual is considered ￿young￿ if his/her age is less than 30 years and ￿old￿ 




We use survey data on employees in the manufacturing sectors in Kenya and Tanzania.
4 For 
both countries we have four years of data: the Kenyan data cover 1993, 1994, 1995 and 2000; 
the Tanzanian data cover 1993, 1994, 1999 and 2001.
5 Four broadly defined manufacturing 
sub-sectors were surveyed: food processing, textiles and garments, wood and furniture, and 
metal-working including machinery. These sub-sectors comprise the bulk of manufacturing 
employment in both countries. Large as well as small firms, including informal ones, were 
included in the sample, and each wave of the data contains information on 150-220 firms. In 
each firm up to 10 workers were interviewed to provide information on personal 
characteristics, characteristics of their jobs and information on earnings and allowances. The 
aim was to sample employees representing all types of jobs in the firms, e.g. casual workers, 
production workers, supervisors, office clerks and managers. There is a panel dimension at 
the firm level, but not at the individual level.
6  
Table 1 shows summary statistics of the key variables in the analysis. To facilitate 
comparison across the two countries, earnings are recorded on a monthly basis and expressed 
in constant 1993 US Dollars. The average of monthly earnings in Kenya is USD 75 while in 
                                                 
4 There are advantages and disadvantages to focussing solely on individuals in the manufacturing 
sector and not the whole population. Because of significant private ownership the manufacturing sector 
provides a relatively good basis for interpreting returns to education as returns to productive skills. In 
contrast, in the public sector earnings are determined by a number of factors orthogonal to productive 
ability, and so the returns to education would have a different interpretation in this sector. Further, 
focusing on one sector only ensures that changes over time are not driven by changes in the relative 
sizes of different sectors, across which there may be radical technological differences. A related point 
is that, for both Tanzania and Kenya, there is no evidence of significant technological progress over the 
1990s. We can thus reasonably argue that for our sample technology is held constant. The main 
disadvantage of focussing only on individuals in the manufacturing sector, is that the results may be 
biased by sample selectivity. We discuss this, and how we deal with this problem, in Section 5. 
5 The first three waves of the Kenyan data, and the first two waves of the Tanzanian data, were 
collected as part of the World Bank￿s Regional Program on Enterprise Development (RPED), while the 
remaining waves of the data were collected by teams from the Centre for the Study of African 
Economies, University of Oxford. The survey instruments and the sampling design were very similar 
both over time and across the two countries, thus providing an excellent basis for comparative analysis. 
For general information on the surveys, see S￿derbom (2001) and Bigsten and Kimuyu (eds.) (2002) 
for Kenya; and Harding, Kaharaya and Rankin (2002), Harding, S￿derbom and Teal (2002), for 
Tanzania.  
6 See Bigsten et al. (2000) for a study of the returns to physical and human capital in five African 
countries. For a panel data analysis based on the firm level data, see S￿derbom and Teal (2004).  
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Tanzania the average is USD 55, indicating a substantial differential across the two countries. 
The average years of education is 9.1 in Kenya and 8.8 in Tanzania. Figure 1 illustrates the 
sample distributions of earnings (in natural logarithms) and education. It is clear that there is 
considerable variation in both variables within each sample. While there is an obvious 
differential across the countries in average earnings, the distributions have similar shapes. For 
education, however, the sample distributions differ markedly across the countries. In 
Tanzania, there is a spike in the data at 7 years of education, while in the Kenyan sample the 
distribution features spikes at 7 and 11 years of education. This pattern of similar earnings 
distributions and different education distributions is interesting. If the aggregate supply of 
education impacts strongly on the returns to education, we would expect the earnings-
education profiles to differ significantly across the countries. We now turn to regression 
analysis to investigate the returns to education in detail. 
 
4.   Earnings Function Estimates 
Table 2a shows OLS estimates of the parameters of the earnings function, by year and cohort, 
for Kenya. Table 2b shows results for Tanzania. We focus on the role of education and, for 
ease of interpretation, show the predicted earnings education profiles in Figures 2a-b. Three 
main results emerge.
7  
First, for both countries there is strong evidence that earnings are non-linear in 
education. For 15 of the 16 regressions reported in Tables 2a-b we can reject the linear model, 
and by implication constant marginal returns to education, at the 10 per cent level of 
significance or lower. Most of the coefficients on the max(.) terms are positive, suggesting 
that earnings are convex in education. Many of the coefficients on max(0,EDUC-12) are quite 
large, indicating sharp increases in the marginal returns to education after 12 years of 
education. This is also apparent in the graphs. 
                                                 
7 In addition to these three main results we also note the following: earnings, conditional on human 
capital, are much higher in Kenya than in Tanzania (Figures 1a-b); the age-earnings profile is, in most 
cases, inverse u-shaped; the tenure coefficient is small, typically less than 0.01 and insignificant; the  
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Second, for both countries the results suggest the earnings profiles differ across 
cohorts. In the range (0,12) years of education the profiles seem steeper for the old than for 
the young cohort, especially for Tanzania. In the case of Tanzania it also looks as though the 
earnings profile is much less convex for the old cohort than for the young. In both countries 
the returns to education for the young cohort are typically very low before the tertiary level.  
Third, for both countries it appears the earnings functions have changed over time. In 
Kenya there is a clear upward intercept shift referring to 1995, which was sustained in 2000 
for the old cohort but not for the young. The shape of the Kenyan profile, however, looks 
quite stable over time, except for 1994. In Tanzania the earnings profiles of 1994, 1999 and 
2001 exhibit more pronounced non-linearities than those of 1993. Comparing the last time 
period to the first it seems clear that earnings have become more convex over time for both 
cohorts. In contrast to Kenya there is little evidence for intercept shifts over time in Tanzania.  
We now investigate whether the data pool over time and/or across cohorts. We start 
from a model where the explanatory variables are interacted with time and cohort in such a 
way as to make the specification equivalent to separate earnings functions as in Tables 2a-b, 
and then test for the joint significance of the relevant interaction terms. Results are reported in 
Table 3. For both countries we can reject at the one per cent level the hypothesis that all the 
time and cohort effects are jointly zero (row 1), hence the earnings equations in Tables 2a-b 
do not pool. We accept the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the control variables (i.e. 
age and its square, tenure, male and capital city) do not vary across cohorts and over time 
(row 2), and firmly reject the hypothesis that the earnings education profile is constant across 
cohorts and over time (row 3). Thus, the control variable effects appear stable over time and 
across cohorts; the education effects do not.  
We drop the interaction terms associated with the control variables, and the cross 
terms between time and cohort, yielding specification 2. The remaining time and cohort 
effects are highly significant (row 1), and there is strong evidence that the shape of the 
                                                                                                                                           
male coefficient is usually positive but only significant in two out of the 16 regressions; and there is a 
wage premium to working in the capital city.  
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earnings education profile varies across cohorts for both countries (row 8). The interaction 
terms between time and cohort crossed and education are redundant, and so we drop these 
next. Table 4 shows the resulting specifications, our preferred models, and Figures 3a-b show 
the predicted earnings education profiles. For both countries the earnings profile for the 
young cohort is virtually flat for less than twelve years of education, indicating small or no 
marginal returns to education before the tertiary level. For Tanzania there is evidence of a 
gradual and systematic change in the shape of the earnings profile for more than twelve years 
of education, with increased convexity as a result. The interaction terms between education 
and time, and education and cohort, are significant at the five per cent level or lower, 
indicating significant differences in the earnings-education profiles both over time and across 
the cohorts. Looking specifically at the first and last wave of the data, we accept the 
hypothesis that the earnings profiles exhibit the same shape for Kenya, and reject it for 
Tanzania.  
 
5. Comparative  Analysis   
Based on our preferred specifications we now analyse more in detail how returns to education 
have changed during the sampling period and how they differ across cohorts. We focus on the 
first and the last wave of the data, thus spanning a period of 7-8 years. We can also put some 
of the results in a longer term context by drawing on the study by Knight and Sabot (1990). 
Panel A in Table 5 summarises the estimated marginal returns to education. Because our 
model is non-linear marginal returns vary with the level of education, and so we report 
sample averages of the individual marginal effects. The average marginal effect in the 
Kenyan sample was 12-13 per cent in 1993 and two percentage points higher in 2000. In the 
Tanzanian sample, the average marginal effect for the young cohort increased from 4 per cent 
in 1993 to 8 per cent in 2001. For the old there was an increase from 8 per cent to 13 per cent. 
If we consider only the sub-samples of individuals with more than 7 years of education, the 
average marginal returns are higher, reflecting the convexity of the earnings functions.   
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These average marginal effects are large, compared to estimates reported in other 
studies. Because the underlying earnings profiles are highly non-linear, they mask substantial 
variation in marginal returns across individuals with different levels of education. In panels B 
and C we show predicted earnings premiums (in logarithmic form) attributable to education, 
using two different baselines: no education (panel B) and primary 5-7 (panel C).  
For Kenya we find that the differentials have shrunk over time at all levels of education 
irrespective of which benchmark is used. In 1980 average log earnings of a Kenyan individual 
with 5-7 years of primary education were about 0.38 higher than that of someone without 
education, representing an earnings differential of 46 per cent. In 1992 the equivalent 
differential was 0.37 for the old cohort and 0.22 for the young, and in 2000 the differentials 
were lower still (we can reject at the five per cent level unchanged differentials between 1992 
and 2000). The trend is similar for higher levels of education. We also find that the 
differentials are smaller in the young cohort.  
For Tanzania the differentials fell between 1980 and 1992 but subsequently increased, 
reflecting the increase in the convexity over the latter period. In 1980 the average earnings of 
a Tanzanian individual with post-secondary education were 183 per cent higher than those of 
someone with no education. In 2000 this difference is bracketed by that of the old (278 per 
cent) and the young (123 per cent) cohort. For Tanzania, the earnings differentials differ 
significantly (at least at the ten per cent level) across the cohorts at all levels of education. 
Comparing across the two countries in the last time period the earnings differentials are 
strikingly similar. 
 
6.   Endogenous Education  
As is well-known, the OLS estimator will give biased estimates of the returns to education if 
education is ￿endogenous￿, i.e. correlated with the residual in the earnings equation. A 
common concern in the literature is that education may be positively correlated with 
unobserved ability, and that the estimates of the returns to education would be upward biased 
as a result. The conventional way of correcting for ability bias is by means of instrumental  
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variable (IV) techniques. We use a closely related alternative to IV estimation, well suited for 
estimating models that are non-linear in the endogenous variable, known as a control function 
approach.
8 This involves regressing education on a set of instruments, and using the estimated 
residual to control for endogeneity in the earnings regression. We use a partial linear model of 
the form ( ) u x y η λ + ⋅ = , where u is the residual from the education regression and  () ⋅ η  is an 
unknown, smooth function. To estimate the parameter vector λ , we use the semiparametric 
approach proposed by Robinson (1988), which this involves estimating  () ⋅ η  using a kernel 
estimator, thus imposing very few restrictions on the shape of  () ⋅ η . In the special case where 
the endogenous variable enters linearly and  () ⋅ η  is linear, the control function approach is 
equivalent to two-stage least squares (2SLS). 
We require valid exclusion restrictions, i.e. variables that are correlated with 
education and uncorrelated with the earnings residual. In the last wave of the data there is 
information on the distance to primary school at the age of six and to secondary school at the 
age of twelve, as well as on parents￿ education and main occupations. These are our potential 
instruments for education. Distance to school is a supply side measure of education and it 
could therefore be reasonably argued that this variable is correlated with education and not 
with ability (Card, 2001). Several recent studies, mostly based on U.S. data, have used similar 
information to form instruments for education. Family background variables have been used 
as instruments for education in many previous studies, on the grounds that such variables 
should have no direct causal effects on earnings.
9  
                                                 
8 As discussed by Amemiya (1974), the standard ￿fitted value￿ method will not work for non-linear 
models. For a recent discussion of the control function approach in the context of estimating 
semiparametric models, see Blundell and Powell (2001). For an early application of the control 
function approach in the context of estimating earnings functions, see Garen (1984). 
9 While these variables may have no direct causal effect on earnings it is still possible that they are 
invalid instruments, e.g. if the ability of parents is correlated with that of their children or if parents 
with a lot of education (or with certain jobs) can help their children develop skills that are subsequently 
rewarded in the labour market. Similarly, if parents with highly able children may choose to live close 
to a school, the distance variable will not be a valid instrument. A dose of caution in interpreting the 
instrumental variable results therefore is recommended.   
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Table 3 reports control function results using the last wave of data for both 
countries.
10 We begin by checking that parental characteristics and distance to school indeed 
have explanatory power for education, a necessary condition for consistency of the estimates. 
Based on the first stage regressions, where education is regressed on all exogenous variables, 
we test for the joint significance of the coefficients on parental characteristics and distance to 
school and find that we can safely reject the hypothesis that these coefficients are jointly zero 
(EXCRES).  
Columns 1 and 2 in Table 3 show control function estimates for the Kenyan sample. 
Individuals in the young cohort with 0-7 years of education receive local returns of about one 
per cent, which is lower than the OLS estimate (Table 2a, col. 7). At higher levels of 
education, however, the estimated returns increase substantially as a result of controlling for 
the endogeneity of education, thus providing even stronger support for convexity than 
obtained by OLS. The picture is similar for the old cohort, column 2, in that that estimated 
returns increase as a result of the instrumenting. For both cohorts linearity of the earnings 
function is firmly rejected. We can reject exogeneity at the ten per cent level for the old 
cohort and at the five per cent level for the young. For the Tanzanian samples the effects of 
controlling for endogeneity of education are smaller. The results reported in column 3 imply 
that in the young cohort the estimated returns are 4-5 percentage points higher than the OLS 
estimates over the entire range of education (Table 2a, col. 7).
11 For the old cohort the control 
function results are almost identical to the OLS results. Consistent with convexity, returns to 
education are highest for individuals with more than 12 years of education. For both cohorts 
we accept exogeneity and reject the linear specification at the ten per cent level or lower.  
The result, obtained for three of the four regressions just discussed, that the estimated 
returns to education increase as a result of treating education as endogenous is not uncommon 
                                                 
10 The reported standard errors have been bootstrapped to take the two-step procedure into account.  
11 The earnings profile is quite wiggly, and in the interval 10-12 years of education the slope is actually 
negative. This seems to be driven by noise in the data, as at the ten per cent level we cannot reject 
linearity of the profile between 7 and 12 years of education. If we impose linearity over this range, the 
estimated returns are between 8 and 10 per cent up to 12 years of education, while beyond 12 years the 
estimated return is 27 per cent.  
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in the literature. Three possible reasons why this may happen, discussed by Card (2001), are 
measurement errors in reported years of education, invalid instruments and heterogeneity in 
the returns to education.
12 While there are almost certainly some reporting errors in the 
education data in our samples, it is our impression (having been present at many of the 
interviews ourselves) that respondents were able to recall years of schooling both with ease 
and with a relatively high degree of accuracy. We would therefore be wary of attributing too 
large a role to reporting errors in this context. A variant on the theme of measurement errors 
is that the true explanatory variable in the earnings function is not years of education, but 
￿knowledge￿. If, for instance, the quality of education differs markedly across schools then 
observed years of education may in practice be a noisy proxy for the true explanatory 
variable. This could explain why the OLS results are quite low. Card￿s second potential 
explanation, invalid instruments, cannot be ruled out, as it is possible that our instruments are 
in fact correlated with the residual of the earnings equation (see footnote 9). We cannot 
establish whether or not this is so, however compared to most other studies of returns to 
education in Africa we would argue that our data contain what would seem, a priori, 
relatively good instruments. The third explanation offered by Card, heterogeneity in the 
returns, should not be relevant in our case since we allow explicitly for non-linearities in the 
earnings profile.  
An alternative possible reason why controlling for endogeneity leads to higher 
estimates is that, in our application, the OLS estimates may be downward biased due to 
sample selectivity, even if education is positively correlated with unobserved ability in the 
population. This can happen if individuals self-select into the manufacturing sector based on 
unobserved ability, and the residual in the selectivity equation is positively correlated with the 
residual in the earnings equation. In this case individuals with low levels of ability, and 
therefore little education, do not get a job in the manufacturing sector unless the residual in 
the selectivity equation is atypically high, hence in the sample (unlike the population) 
                                                 
12 Card discusses a fourth reason why controlling for endogeneity tends to increase the estimated 
returns, namely specification searching by the econometrician.   
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education and the selectivity residual are negatively correlated. Because the selectivity 
residual is positively correlated with the earnings residual, the latter may well be negatively 
correlated with education in the sample, in which case the OLS estimator would be downward 
biased. The control function estimator, however, would be consistent, provided that the 
instruments are uncorrelated with ability and the residual in the selectivity equation. 
 
7. Conclusions 
Three main findings have emerged in this study. First, there is strong evidence that the 
earnings function is convex for both Kenya and Tanzania, a result robust to endogeneity. The 
control function estimates are generally larger than their OLS counterparts and in one case out 
of four (the young cohort in Kenya) we can reject exogeneity at the five per cent level. A 
reasonable interpretation of the results is that there is some downward bias in the OLS results, 
but probably not as much as some of the control function results imply. Second, there are 
significant differences in the earnings profiles across the cohorts, typically with stronger 
convexity in the young cohort. Third, for Tanzania there is increasing convexity over the 
1990s, for Kenya remarkable stability.  
There is limited empirical evidence on changes in the returns to education in 
developing countries over long periods of time. Our data have enabled us to document 
changes in the returns to education in Kenya and Tanzania during the 1990s and also allowed 
a direct comparison with earlier work by Knight and Sabot (1990). It is clear that in both 
countries the returns to education have been variable since 1980. One of the primary 
hypotheses advanced to explain the increased returns to education observed in the U.S. is the 
possibility of skill biased technical change. This is unlikely to be the reason for the dynamics 
of returns to education in Kenya and Tanzania, as the rate of technological progress in 
manufacturing has been at best modest in these countries over the last decades (Bigsten, 2002; 
Pack, 2002). An alternative hypothesis for changing returns to education, advanced by Adrian 
Wood, is that increases in trade exert downward pressure on unskilled wages in developed 
countries, thus raising returns to education by a quite different route to that suggested by skill  
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biased technical change. Investigating the role of openness to trade in this context appears an 
interesting area for future research. 
As noted in the introduction, the policy recommendation that primary education should 
be the priority in poor countries is often based on the idea that earnings are concave in 
education. With convexity and low returns at low levels, the premise of this recommendation 
is undermined. The implication is not  that poor countries should invest less in primary 
education. Only with sound primary education will individuals be able to proceed to the levels 
of education associated with higher returns. Convexity, however, does imply that the effect of 
education policies designed to stimulate individuals who otherwise would have no or little 
education to obtain only a modestly higher amount will have a small aggregate effect on 
income and poverty. Finally, one of the micro-macro puzzles in the development literature is 
why at the macro level the expansion of education in Africa during the last two decades has 
generated so little growth, while at the micro level the average returns to education appear 
high. With convexity, these two results can be reconciled if, as probably is the case, the 
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 Kenya  Tanzania 
  Mean Standard  Dev. Mean Standard  Dev. 
Earnings  74.6  117.4 54.7 71.2 
Years of Education  9.1  2.9  8.8  3.5 
Age  33.9  9.1 35.5 10.0 
Years of Tenure  7.9  7.2  8.1  7.3 
Male Dummy  0.85    0.80   
Works in Capital City  0.64    0.44   
Old Cohort
(1) 0.57    0.63   
      
Observations  4039  2738  






RETURNS TO EDUCATION IN KENYAN MANUFACTURING: 1993-2000 
  1993 1994 1995 2000 
  [1] Young   [2] Old  [3 Young  [4] Old  [5] Young   [6] Old  [7] Young  [8] Old 
Age  0.035 0.052  -0.021 0.026 0.243 0.074 0.040 0.047 
  (0.117) (0.031) (0.119) (0.034) (0.099)*  (0.037)*  (0.111) (0.037) 
Age squared/100  -0.024 -0.032  0.075 -0.019 -0.429 -0.075 -0.024 -0.035 
  (0.234) (0.036) (0.235) (0.040) (0.199)*  (0.044) (0.223) (0.042) 
Tenure  -0.002 0.001 0.021 0.012 0.023 0.006 0.003 0.008 
  (0.010) (0.003) (0.010)*  (0.004)**  (0.010)*  (0.004) (0.012) (0.004)* 
Male  -0.001 0.135  -0.021 0.088 0.049 0.121 0.106  -0.031 
  (0.074) (0.080) (0.063) (0.082) (0.063) (0.074) (0.066) (0.078) 
Capital city  0.367 0.320 0.287 0.368 0.342 0.319 0.251 0.201 
  (0.056)** (0.047)** (0.052)** (0.053)** (0.052)** (0.050)** (0.055)** (0.055)** 
Education   0.027 0.061 0.023 0.038 0.007 0.009 0.027 0.014 
  (0.035) (0.017)**  (0.028) (0.019)*  (0.043) (0.023) (0.143) (0.026) 
max(0,EDUC-7)  -0.041 0.027 0.003 0.006 0.042 0.065 0.018 0.124 
  (0.056) (0.037) (0.051) (0.043) (0.065) (0.044) (0.164) (0.051)* 
max(0,EDUC-10)  0.247 0.136 0.060 0.220  -0.021 0.008 0.103  -0.034 
  (0.089)**  (0.075) (0.100) (0.098)*  (0.102) (0.089) (0.107) (0.093) 
max(0,EDUC-12)  -0.009 0.064 0.083  -0.194 0.240 0.166 0.116 0.277 
  (0.107) (0.091) (0.120) (0.121) (0.095)*  (0.095) (0.091) (0.104)** 
          
Test: Education earnings 
profile linear (p-value) 
0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
          
R-squared  0.288 0.374 0.182 0.261 0.363 0.265 0.377 0.317 
Observations  429 675 460 488 467 570 371 579 
          
Note: The dependent variable the log of monthly earnings. Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and intra-firm correlation are reported in parenthesis. 
Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level is indicated by * , ** and 
+ respectively.   
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TABLE 2B 
RETURNS TO EDUCATION IN TANZANIAN MANUFACTURING: 1993-2001 
  1993 1994 1999 2001 
  [1] Young   [2] Old  [3 Young  [4] Old  [5] Young   [6] Old  [7] Young  [8] Old 
Age  0.035  -0.006  -0.068 0.043 0.220 0.060 0.265 0.014 
  (0.108) (0.027) (0.164) (0.051) (0.133) (0.038) (0.151) (0.037) 
Age squared/100  -0.016  0.020  0.179 -0.036 -0.374 -0.052 -0.460 -0.011 
  (0.219) (0.030) (0.332) (0.057) (0.265) (0.042) (0.304) (0.042) 
Tenure  0.004  -0.001 0.008 0.005  -0.018  -0.000 0.004 0.004 
  (0.011) (0.003) (0.018) (0.006) (0.011) (0.004) (0.013) (0.004) 
Male  0.044 0.186 0.083 0.160 0.063  -0.098 0.270 0.058 
  (0.065) (0.066)**  (0.102) (0.107) (0.073) (0.096) (0.082)**  (0.081) 
Capital city  0.068 0.194 0.279 0.371 0.171 0.119 0.271 0.184 
  (0.056)  (0.045)** (0.091)** (0.084)** (0.060)** (0.059)*  (0.070)** (0.057)** 
Education   0.055 0.034 0.019 0.042  -0.010 0.061 0.053 0.030 
  (0.041) (0.015)*  (0.056) (0.027) (0.025) (0.018)**  (0.042) (0.025) 
max(0,EDUC-7)  -0.012 0.048 0.058  -0.024 0.047 0.031 0.068 0.087 
  (0.059) (0.041) (0.086) (0.071) (0.049) (0.048) (0.065) (0.050) 
max(0,EDUC-10)  0.005  0.076 -0.209  0.216 -0.043 -0.016 -0.297 -0.083 
  (0.125) (0.089) (0.177) (0.155) (0.118) (0.116) (0.141)*  (0.107) 
max(0,EDUC-12)  0.085  -0.076 0.561  -0.122 0.216 0.231 0.469 0.269 
  (0.156) (0.086) (0.205)**  (0.148) (0.139) (0.124) (0.157)**  (0.114)* 
          
Test: Education earnings 
profile linear (p-value) 
0.65 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 
          
R-squared  0.140 0.318 0.250 0.318 0.207 0.417 0.304 0.389 
Observations  304 601 176 268 297 433 227 432 
          





  Specification 1  Specification 2 
 
Null hypothesis  Kenya   Tanzania  Kenya   Tanzania 


































































Restrictions imposed  None  None  2, 6  2, 6 
      
Note: The table shows p-values associated with Wald tests of the various null hypotheses. The underlying 





  Kenya Tanzania 
 
  Coef. Std.Error Coef. Std.Error
Age  0.044 0.011** 0.041 0.011**
Age squared/100  -0.033 0.014* -0.034 0.013*
Tenure  0.006 0.002** 0.001 0.003 
Male  0.053 0.036 0.099 0.034**
Capital city  0.306 0.040** 0.188 0.049**
Wave 2  0.067 0.116 0.032 0.184 
Wave 3  0.433 0.123** -0.177 0.138 
Wave 4  0.433 0.115** -0.059 0.131 
Education   0.033 0.020
+ -0.003 0.019 
max(0,EDUC-7)  -0.021 0.037 0.064 0.040 
max(0,EDUC-10)  0.184 0.069** -0.049 0.106 
max(0,EDUC-12)  0.068 0.086 0.106 0.142 
Wave 2 x Education  -0.014 0.022 0.009 0.027 
Wave 2 x max(0,EDUC-7)  0.008  0.047  -0.040  0.058 
Wave 2 x max(0,EDUC-10)   -0.029 0.098 0.025 0.136 
Wave 2 x max(0,EDUC-12)  -0.136 0.146 0.091 0.150 
Wave 3 x Education  -0.034  0.020
+ 0.028  0.020 
Wave 3 x max(0,EDUC-7)  0.050  0.040  -0.019  0.045 
Wave 3 x max(0,EDUC-10)   -0.157 0.088
+ -0.078  0.129 
Wave 3 x max(0,EDUC-12)  0.117 0.104 0.248 0.157 
Wave 4 x Education  -0.043  0.019*  0.023  0.020 
Wave 4 x max(0,EDUC-7)  0.095  0.047*  0.011  0.046 
Wave 4 x max(0,EDUC-10)   -0.144 0.095  -0.192 0.124 
Wave 4 x max(0,EDUC-12)  0.129 0.097 0.368 0.146* 
Old -0.302  0.109**  -0.270  0.121* 
Old x Education  0.022  0.017  0.030  0.016
+ 
Old x max(0,EDUC-7) 0.038  0.032  -0.010  0.036 
Old x max(0,EDUC-10)  -0.021 0.061 0.148 0.105 
Old x max(0,EDUC-12)  -0.018 0.074  -0.209 0.145 
      
Education x time (p-value)  0.01    0.04   
Education x old (p-value)  0.00    0.00   
Wave 4 interactions (p-value)  0.17    0.02   
Note: The dependent variable the log of monthly earnings. Standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and intra-firm correlation. Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level is indicated by 





























A. Average marginal returns        
Kenya    0.12 0.13 0.14 0.15     
Kenya,  >7  years    0.15 0.18 0.15 0.19     
Tanzania    0.04 0.08 0.08 0.12     
Tanzania, > 7 years    0.05  0.10  0.12  0.17     
B. Earnings differentials, baseline: No education 
K e n y a          
  Primary 1 to 4 (E2)  0.18  0.11  0.18  -0.03  0.04  0.18  0.03 
  Primary 5 to 7 (E3)  0.38  0.22  0.37  -0.07  0.08  0.18  0.03 
    Secondary  (E4)  0.86 0.26 0.59 0.10 0.43 0.00 0.25 
    Post-secondary  (E5)  1.62 0.97 1.42 0.68 1.13 0.00 0.04 
T a n z a n i a          
  Primary 1 to 4 (E2)  0.06  -0.01  0.10  0.08  0.19  0.06  0.24 
  Primary 5 to 7 (E3)  0.28  -0.02  0.19  0.14  0.35  0.06  0.24 
    Secondary  (E4)  0.64 0.15 0.41 0.40 0.67 0.04 0.10 
    Post-secondary  (E5)  1.04 0.43 0.96 0.80 1.33 0.00 0.02 
C. Earnings differentials, baseline: Primary 5-7  
K e n y a          
  Secondary (E4)  0.48 0.04 0.22 0.17 0.35 0.00 0.20 
  Post-secondary (E5)  1.24 0.75 1.05 0.75 1.05 0.00 0.97 
T a n z a n i a          
  Secondary (E4)  0.36 0.17 0.22 0.26 0.32 0.47 0.36 
  Post-secondary (E5)  0.76 0.45 0.77 0.66 0.98 0.00 0.04 
         
Note: The estimates for 1980 are based on Knight and Sabot (1990), Table 6-2, column 3. The estimates for 1993 
and 2000/01 are based on the regressions reported in Table 4.  
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TABLE 6 
SEMIPARAMETRIC INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE ESTIMATES:  
KENYA 2000 AND TANZANIA 2001 
 Kenya  Tanzania 
 
  [1] Young   [2] Old  [3] Young  [4] Old 
Age  -0.032 0.029 0.291 0.007 
 (0.126)  (0.047)  (0.144)*  (0.038) 
Age  squared/100  0.063 -0.004 -0.539 -0.003 
 (0.249)  (0.053)  (0.285)
+ (0.043) 
Tenure  0.026 0.013 0.013 0.005 
 (0.014)
+ (0.005)**  (0.017)  (0.004) 
Male  0.268 0.002 0.365 0.066 
 (0.094)**  (0.081)  (0.085)**  (0.081) 
Capital  city  0.235 0.206 0.241 0.182 
 (0.060)**  (0.093)*  (0.089)**  (0.091)* 
Education    0.011 0.111 0.090 0.028 
 (0.168)  (0.048)*  (0.098)  (0.038) 
max(0,EDUC-7)  0.132 0.116 0.072 0.106 
 (0.185)  (0.057)*  (0.108)  (0.049)* 
max(0,EDUC-10)  0.148 -0.046 -0.296 -0.083 
  (0.099) (0.086) (0.189) (0.122) 
max(0,EDUC-12)  0.103 0.313 0.478 0.268 
  (0.098)  (0.097)* (0.199)* (0.174) 
Education earnings 
profile linear (p-val.) 
0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 
EXCRES (p-value)
(1)  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
EXOGEN (p-value)
(2) 0.02 0.09 0.95 0.99 
Observations  371 579 227 432 
Note: The dependent variable the log of monthly earnings. All regressions control for endogeneity of 
education by means of a semiparametric control function as described in the text. Bootstrapped standard 
errors, robust to heteroskedasticity and intra-firm correlation are reported in parenthesis. Significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% level is indicated by * , ** and 
+ respectively. The explanatory variables in the 
regression modelling education (step 1) are: dummy variables for mother’s and father’s education (none; 
primary; middle (pre 1964) or training college; O level; A level; vocational/technical; university; don’t 
know) and occupation (farming, fishing, forestry; trading, self-employed; clerical; employed in 
construction, tailoring, or worked as foreman; professional; watchman, soldier; don￿t know); dummy 
variables for distance to primary school at the age of six and to secondary school at the age of twelve 
(less than 1 km; 1-3 km; 3-6 km; 6-10 km; more than 10 km; don￿t know); and age, age squared, tenure, 
male, capital city.  
(1) Wald test for joint significance of the identifying instruments in step 1 (the exclusion restrictions).  




SAMPLE DISTRIBUTIONS OF LOG EARNINGS AND EDUCATION 
 















































PREDICTED EARNINGS BASED ON RESULTS IN TABLE 2A: KENYA 
i) Old Cohort  ii) Young Cohort 
ed
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PREDICTED EARNINGS BASED ON RESULTS IN TABLE 2B: TANZANIA 
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